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In the last few years, it has become more and 
more obvious that the dissemination of unreliable 
information is an important social problem. However, 
the focus has not been on the «classical» forms of 
pseudoscience – astrology, ufology, etc. Instead, the 
discussion has been couched in other terms, such as 
science denial, fact resistance, and alternative facts. 
Are these just subspecies of pseudoscience, or are they 
in some way fundamentally different?
■■ A KEY ISSUE
Alice: Can you help me? I can’t 
find my keys.
BAiley (her partner): Have you 
checked your pockets carefully?
Alice: Yes. I have emptied all 
of them.
BAiley: Perhaps you left the keys in the bathroom?
Alice: No, I have looked carefully, and they are not 
there.
BAiley: What about your coat pockets?
Alice: I have checked, but I can do so again. 
(Searches the coat pockets carefully.) No, they are not 
there.
BAiley: Are you sure the keys are in the house?
Alice: Yes. No one was at home when I came. So I 
must have opened the door myself, and I didn’t leave 
the house after that, so the keys must be here in the 
house.
BAiley: Perhaps you brought something with you 
that you put down somewhere, and then you put the 
keys in the same place.
Alice: I only had a newspaper with me.
BAiley: And where did you put it?
Alice: On the kitchen table. It’s still there.
BAiley (after searching the kitchen table): But the 
keys aren’t there.
Alice: That was almost my last 
hope.
BAiley: Don’t give up that 
easily! They must be somewhere. 
Let’s have a look at the shelf in the 
bedroom where you charge your 
cell phone.
Alice: That’s no idea. I still 
have the phone in my pocket.
BAiley: Don’t be too sure. Perhaps you went there 
to charge it, and then changed your mind. Let me 
check… (Leaves and comes back after a minute.) No, 
its not there.
Alice: How bad. I really don’t know where to look 
now.
(The doorbell rings. Alice opens.)
The visiTor: Hi, my name is Frances. I’m your new 
neighbour.
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Alice: Nice to meet you. My name is Alice, and this 
is Bailey. Please come in!
FrAnces: Thanks, but I don’t have much time. 
I hadn’t planned to visit you today, but I saw these keys 
in your front door, clearly visible from the street. So I 
thought I should tell you.
Alice: Thanks a lot, that’s awfully kind of you. 
I have been searching for those keys for the last half 
hour or so. Sure you don’t want a cup of coffee?
FrAnces: I’d love to, but I’m quite in a hurry. Let’s 
meet again soon. Good-bye.
Alice And BAiley: Good-bye.
BAiley: What a relief. I could have gone on 
searching the house for hours without thinking of the 
front door.
Alice (putting the key in its usual place in a 
cupboard): Yes, and I was thoroughly wrong when 
I said that since I entered the house with the keys, they 
must be inside the house.
The participants in this dialogue do a lot of the 
things that scientists also do. They engage in activities 
such as: proposing hypotheses (Bailey proposed several 
places where the keys might be), testing hypotheses 
(they both searched places where they hypothesized 
that the keys could be), drawing conclusions (Alice 
concluded that since she had opened the house with 
the keys, they had to be in the house), criticizing 
conclusions (Bailey criticized Alice’s conclusion that 
since her phone was in her pocket, the keys could not 
be where she charges her phone), accepting pertinent 
information from outsiders (they both accepted 
Frances’s information that the keys were in the front 
door), and admitting one’s own mistakes (Alice 
admitted that she was wrong in concluding that the 
keys had to be in the house).
All of these are behaviours that we consider typical 
for science. But surely, searching for a key is not a 
scientific activity?
■■ FACT-FINDING PRACTICES
Searching for a key is certainly not a scientific activity, 
but just like the empirical sciences it is an activity 
aimed at finding out empirical facts; in short: a fact-
finding activity. Besides science, there are several other 
well-established fact-finding activities in our societies. 
Mechanics searching for the defect in a malfunctioning 
machine, doctors seeking the right diagnosis for a 
patient, journalists evaluating what their sources 
have told them, police officers performing a criminal 
investigation, and a jury trying to determine if the 
defendant has committed the crime – all these are cases 
of co-operation to find out the facts about something.
Such fact-finding practices can be found in 
all human societies, including indigenous ones. 
Anthropologists have usually not paid much attention 
to them, but one fascinating case has been investigated 
in some detail: the tracking of animals in traditional 
hunting societies (Liebenberg, 1990, 2013).
Hunters using traditional weapons usually cannot 
kill large prey immediately. Therefore, they have to 
track and follow the animal for many hours before 
they can kill it. This is called «persistence hunting». 
Although most game animals are faster than humans 
over short distances, humans have more endurance, and 
they can therefore run down prey by pursuing them 
for many hours, often a day or two. This technique has 
been used by hunter-gatherers all around the world 
(Carrier et al., 1984). Hunters in the Kalahari desert 
(which covers large parts of Botswana and Namibia) 
are masters of this type of hunting. It is performed 
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is «a process of creative problem solving in which 
hypotheses are continually tested against spoor 
evidence, rejecting those which do not stand up and 
replacing them with better hypotheses» (Liebenberg, 
1990, p. 71). The group of hunters who follow an 
animal search for its tracks and analyse them. They 
discuss vividly, proposing hypotheses on where the 
animal may have gone, criticizing and testing each 
other’s hypotheses. When discussing animal behaviour, 
they take great care to cite the evidence in favour of 
various claims and to distinguish between facts (for 
instance, tracks that they have seen) and hypotheses. 
They are willing to admit gaps in their own knowledge, 
and they are often sceptical against each other’s 
statements (Blurton-Jones & Konner, 1976). All of this 
corresponds closely to the unwritten rules of scientific 
discussions that today’s young scientists have to learn.
All the fact-finding practices aim at finding out how 
things are, in contradistinction for instance to how 
we wish them to be, or how they should or could be. 
Largely due to this common purpose they have many 
characteristics in common. The following five are 
particularly important.
First, fact-finding practices are all objectivist, in the 
sense that they rely on the assumptions that we all live 
in the same world and that the facts about it should be 
the same for all of us. For instance, when a group of 
Kalahari hunters discuss where the antelope might have 
gone, they are by no means epistemic relativists. Their 
discussion is based on the assumption that there must 
be one single truth in this matter. The antelope could 
not be «far to the east in your world but still close to 
us in my world». They are looking for shared, well-
founded judgments about the world in which we all live.
Secondly, fact-finding practices make a clear 
distinction between facts and values, and aim at finding 
the former. It is a basic feature of human reasoning that 
we are capable of distinguishing our factual beliefs 
from our other attitudes and reactions to what happens 
around us. We do this all the time in our daily lives 
– more or less perfectly – but in fact-finding practices 
we have to do it more carefully. This is the reason why 
juries are often instructed that they have «a duty to find 
the facts» and «must not be influenced by any personal 
likes or dislikes, prejudices or sympathy» (Hornby, 
2014, p. 60). It is also the reason why scientists are 
trained to let themselves be influenced as little as 
possible by this type of values (other types of values 
can improve the fact-finding process; this applies for 
instance to positive evaluations of various scientific 
virtues; see Hansson, 2017a).
Thirdly, although fact-finding practices make use 
of both reasoning and empirical investigations, they 
«ARE SCIENCE DENIAL,  
FACT RESISTANCE, AND ALTERNATIVE 
FACTS JUST SUBSPECIES 
OF PSEUDOSCIENCE?»
Efforts to find empirical evidence are present in all human 
societies, including indigenous ones. A fascinating case is that 
of the groups of hunters from the Kalahari desert who practice 
what is known as «persistence hunting»: they follow an animal’s 
footsteps for hours, even days, until the prey is exhausted. In the 
process, participants discuss, propose and discard hypotheses and 
seek empirical evidence to find the animal. In the image, a group 
of hunters from Namibia look at the ground to find the trail of the 
animal they are following.
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always give precedence to well-conducted empirical 
observations. On a hunt, our knowledge about animal 
behaviour may give us strong reasons to believe that 
the steenbok will head for the waterhole, but if its 
tracks go in the opposite direction, then we will have 
to change our minds. Jones’s motives and previous 
crime record may give the police strong reasons 
to believe that he committed the crime, but if the 
evidence from the crime scene shows that someone 
else did it, then they will have to redirect their 
investigations.
Fourthly, fact-finding practices are communal 
undertakings in which contributions are both 
welcomed and critically appraised, independently 
of whom they come from. On the one hand, this 
means that proposals and observations by the 
youngest and most inexperienced participant in a 
Kalahari hunting party, the police cadet taking part 
in her first criminal investigation, and the trainee 
mechanic helping to identify what is wrong with a 
motor, are all encouraged to 
contribute to the discussion, 
and their contributions will not 
be dismissed because of their 
inexperience. On the other hand, 
it also means that although a 
highly-experienced participant in 
any of these practices will have 
everyone’s ear, what she says can 
always be refuted by evidence or 
convincing arguments presented 
by anyone else who takes part in 
the endeavour.
Juries have been described as representing 
a «democratic culture in which rich and poor 
citizens from all walks of life came together as 
equals» (Amar, 2002, p. 108. Cf. Wilkenfeld, 2004, 
pp. 2320–2322). Jurors are typically instructed that 
«you ought to pay proper respect to each other’s 
opinions and you ought to listen with a mind open to 
being convinced by each other’s arguments» (Hornby, 
2014, p. 276). The same instruction would be equally 
appropriate for a group of hunters tracking down a 
prey, or for a group of scientists attending a seminar 
or workshop.
Fifthly, fact-finding practices are open in the sense 
of aiming at continuous improvement. Substantial 
criticism has to be taken seriously. New knowledge 
must be acknowledged and assimilated, and cherished 
beliefs have to be given up when the evidence 
gives reason to do so. Communal fact-finding is 
incompatible with rigid belief systems based on 
allegedly incorrigible beliefs.
■■ SCIENCE
Some of the fact-finding practices are called «sciences». 
The sciences differ from other such practices in being 
more systematized and specialized, and focusing more 
on generalizations and explanations. This is a matter 
of degree rather than kind. The Kalahari hunters have 
use for knowledge about general patterns in animal 
behaviour, but the emphasis on such generalities is 
much weaker than in biological science. Obviously, 
there are also large differences in terms of scale and 
resources between modern science and indigenous 
fact-finding practices, but it is nevertheless important to 
recognize what they have in common. The fact-finding 
practices in traditional societies are forerunners of 
modern science, just as oral storytelling is the origin 
of modern literature and filmmaking. There are strong 
continuities between the thought patterns in modern 
science and those that we all employ, like our ancient 
ancestors, in various everyday situations when we need 
to find out what is really the case.
Science is a universal project, 
striving for knowledge that is 
common to all of humanity. 
The different sciences are 
interdependent, and form 
together a community of 
knowledge disciplines. They all 
strive to obtain reliable general 
knowledge, and they all respect 
each other in their respective 
areas of specialization (Hansson, 
2007). Obviously, nothing like modern science was 
possible before the era of global communications. 
It is often called «Western science», but this is a 
misnomer that downplays its universal nature and 
its multicultural origins. As we have seen, science 
is based on a way of thinking that can be found in 
fact-finding practices in all human cultures. It relies on 
crucial discoveries by ancient Iraqi (Mesopotamian) 
astronomers, Indian mathematicians, and Arabic 
physicists (Teresi, 2002). Today, scientists on all 
continents make essential contributions at the research 
front. Calling science «Western» is Eurocentric hubris.
This is not just a matter of setting history right. 
The idea that science is a unique practice, developed 
among a Western elite, and radically different from any 
other practice in human history, is a dangerous myth. 
It is dangerous because it contributes to estranging 
the public from science. In today’s world, we need to 
emphasize what is common to all of humanity and 
what connects different cultures with each other. This 
applies not least to our fact-finding practices.
«ALL THE FACT-FINDING 
PRACTICES AIM AT FINDING 
OUT HOW THINGS ARE, 
IN CONTRADISTINCTION FOR 
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■■ RATIONAL DISCOURSE
Fact-finding practices form part of a larger category, 
namely rational discourses (see Figure 1). There are 
also rational discourses that are not devoted to 
(empirical) fact-finding. Non-empirical sciences, 
such as mathematics and philosophy, are prominent 
examples, and so is legal deliberation on how the 
law should be interpreted or developed. A rational 
discourse that does not refer to empirical reality 
differs from fact-finding practices in having 
conceptual and logical coherence as its ultimate 
criterion, rather than agreement with empirical 
observations. In spite of this, the thought patterns 
are similar in many respects. For instance, 
hypotheses are advanced and tested, but these tests 
are usually called something else (such as «thought 
experiments» or «examples»), and they concern 
coherence and intuitive plausibility, rather than 
empirical validity.
All forms of specialized, rational discourse 
– whether fact-finding or not – can be seen as 
enhancements of patterns that are also found in other, 
less specialized deliberations and conversations. 
Even in simple everyday conversations we expect 
a certain level of rationality. In some contexts, it is 
particularly important to get things right and to make 
sure that we understand each other. We then have to 
express ourselves as clearly and precisely as possible, 
take the arguments of others seriously, and accept a 
convincing argument no matter who puts it forward. 
These are universal virtues of rational deliberation 
and discussion, independently of the context and the 
subject matter, but in some contexts and for some 
subject matters they are particularly important.
In popular culture, a high degree of rationality is 
often associated with a lack of empathy and general 
emotional deficiency. Obviously, certain types of 
emotions stand in the way of rationality. Rational 
argumentation has to be impersonal in the sense 
of focusing on standpoints and ideas, abstracted 
from their bearers. However, there are other types 
of emotions that are essential for rationality. In any 
kind of rational reasoning, we must be emotionally 
prepared to go where the argument leads and to 
give up cherished ideas. A participant in a rational 
conversation must be able to engage seriously in 
other participants’ intellectual endeavours. She must 
be prepared to give them right even when they point 
out weaknesses in her own arguments and ideas. 
This can be emotionally taxing. The capacity to be 










Figure 1. The areas of rational discourse. Area 1 represents scientific 
subject matters; area 2, empirical subject matters that do not 
belong to the realm of science; and area 3, non-empirical subject 
matters that are accessible through rational discussion.
Sciences differ from other such practices in being more 
systematized and specialized, in their scale and resources. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize what they have in 
common, since modern science derives from the research 
practices of traditional societies. In the image, a biologist searches 
with her hands for specimens of signal crayfish, an invasive species 
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■■ VARIANTS OF DELUSION
Let us now return to the question which we started 
with: the connections among the commonly discussed 
forms of irrationality, such as pseudoscience, science 
denial, fact resistance, disinformation («alternative 
facts»), and logical fallacies.
Pseudoscience means, literally, “false science”; 
in other words, delusive claims or activities within 
the area marked 1 in Figure 1. As I have argued 
more extensively elsewhere (Hansson, 2013), a 
pseudoscience can be defined as a doctrine satisfying 
the three criteria that a) its subject area is within 
the domains of science, b) it is so unreliable that it 
cannot at all be trusted, and c) its major proponents 
present it as the most reliable information that is 
available. Pseudoscience comes in two major forms 
(Hansson, 2017b). One of these is pseudo-theory 
promotion. Pseudosciences within that category 
have as their primary aim to promote a particular 
theory that deviates from science. Major examples 
are homeopathy, phrenology, reflexology, astrology, 
scientology, ufology, and ancient astronaut theories.
The other form of pseudoscience is science 
denial(ism). These are the pseudosciences that are 
primarily driven by a desire to 
fight down some scientific theory 
or branch of science. The term 
was first used about holocaust 
denialism, the pseudoscientific 
doctrine that the Nazi holocaust 
did not take place. Today the 
most prominent form is climate 
science denialism. Other 
examples are creationism (whose 
main goal is to overthrow 
evolutionary biology), relativity theory denial, tobacco 
disease denial, HIV denialism, and vaccination 
denialism.
There is no sharp line between pseudo-theory 
promotion and science denialism. Most forms 
of pseudoscience have elements of both, but can 
nevertheless be classified as belonging predominantly 
to one of them. The two forms of pseudoscience have 
many characteristics in common, for instance their 
neglect of refuting information, their cherry-picking 
of data and unwillingness to consider the whole body 
of scientific evidence, their inability to get published 
in peer-reviewed journals, and their proneness to 
conspiracy theories to account for this and other 
failures.
However, there are also interesting differences 
between the two forms of pseudoscience. Perhaps most 
importantly, science denialism usually proceeds by 
producing false controversies; i.e., 
claims that there is a scientific 
controversy when there is in 
fact none. This is an old strategy 
that was applied already in the 
1930s by relativity theory deniers 
(Wazeck, 2009, pp. 268–269). In 
more recent years it has been 
used extensively by tobacco 
disease deniers sponsored by the 
tobacco industry and by climate science denialists 
sponsored by the fossil fuel industry (Boykoff, 
2008; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Dunlap & Jacques, 
2013; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). In contrast, this 
strategy is seldom used in pseudo-theory promotion. 
Instead, advocates of teachings such as astrology and 
homeopathy tend to downplay the conflicts between 
their own claims and those of mainstream science, and 
describe their theories as much more easily compatible 
with conventional science than what they really are.
In area 2 of the diagram we find erroneous claims 
within the realms of other fact-finding practices 
than science. Since the basic rules for reasoning and 
investigation are essentially the same as in science, 
the flaws in these claims are usually of the same 
kind as in pseudoscience. For instance, in January 
2017 Donald Trump repeatedly claimed that his 
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those of his predecessor, in spite of photographic 
and other evidence showing indubitably that «his» 
crowd was in fact much smaller (Ford, 2017). This is 
an example of the same type of neglect of evidence 
that we find for instance among creationists, anti-
vaccinationists, and flat earth believers. The only 
reason why we do not call Trump’s claims about 
crowd size «pseudoscientific» is that they concern 
issues outside of the realm of science. In general, the 
fallacies that are typical of pseudoscience are also 
common in topics that we entrust to fact-finding 
journalists rather than scientists. For instance, 
numerous Internet sites are devoted to cherry-picking 
crimes committed by members of a particular 
religious or ethnic group in order to create the 
wrongful impression that the presence of this group 
threatens everyone else’s security.
We can distinguish, in this area, between fact 
resistance and disinformation. By fact resistance, 
we mean an unwillingness to accept what is for good 
reasons generally accepted as valid knowledge. By 
disinformation, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, «the dissemination of deliberately false 
information». There is a close analogy with the 
distinction between science denial and pseudotheory 
promotion. In this case as well, the distinction is a 
matter of degree rather than a strict dichotomy.
Finally, in area 3 of the diagram we find fallacies 
in discussions on non-empirical subject matter. This 
includes errors in mathematics and other formalized 
disciplines as well as non-sequiturs in ethics and 
other branches of philosophy. The latter are the types 
of delusions that philosophers are usually best suited 
to disclose, since the subject matter is within their 
expertise. But the recent re-emergence of political 
forces that use pseudoscience and disinformation 
to reach power makes is necessary for philosophers 
to pay close attention to the whole spectrum of 
disinformation and faulty reasoning.  
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Scientific denialism often acts by creating false polemics. One of 
the current cases of this phenomenon is climate change denialism. 
In the images, demonstrators of the Peoples Climate March, held 













  MÈTODE 131
The scam of pseudoscience
MONOGRAPH
